This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (...) (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. (shrink)

How can we assess the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making? Sceptics doubt such assessments are possible, as they must rely on controversial substantive standards of truth and rightness. Challenging that scepticism, this paper suggests a procedure-independent standard for assessing the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making by evaluating whether it is adequately supported by reasons. Adequate support for conclusion is a necessary aspect of epistemic quality for any epistemic justification of democracy, though particularly relevant to theories that emphasize public deliberation. Finding (...) existing methods for measuring the quality of public discourse to fall short, we draw on an epistemological theory of argumentation to provide a more sophisticated approach to evaluating the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making, illustrate how the approach can be used, and demonstrate its relevance for the epistemic turn in democratic theory. (shrink)

How should the state justify its coercive rules? Public reason liberalism endorses a public justification requirement: Justifications offered for authoritative regulations must be acceptable to all members of the relevant public. However, as a criterion of legitimacy, the public justification requirement is epistemically unreliable: It prioritizes neither the exclusion of false beliefs nor the inclusion of true beliefs in justifications of political rules. This article presents an epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement. Employing epistemological theories of argumentation, we demonstrate (...) how this approach enables assessing the epistemic quality of justifications of political rules, even when the truth is difficult to establish. (shrink)

In this chapter we examine Moti Mizrahi’s claim that philosophers’ opposition of scientism is founded on their worry that scientism poses “a threat to the soul or essence of philosophy as an a priori discipline”. We find Mizrahi’s methodology for testing this thesis wanting. We offer an alternative hypothesis for the increased resistance of scientism: the antipathy started as a reaction to the New Atheist movement. We also consider two varieties of weak scientism, narrow and broad, and argue that narrow (...) versions of scientism draw unnatural and unfounded distinctions within science. Mizrahi belongs somewhere between these two types, but he commits the same mistakes as proponents of the narrow variety. We demonstrate that Mizrahi’s defence of weak scientism is problematic, once again, due to methodological reasons. As an alternative, we propose that weak scientism should be based on epistemic opportunism. Epistemic opportunism explains the success of science with scientists’ willingness to adopt any methods that demonstrably work. We also show how opportunistic scientism can avoid charges of triviality. (shrink)

According to a standard account of incomparability, two value bearers are incomparable if it is false that there holds a positive value relation between them. Due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates it may also be indeterminate as to which relation that holds - for each relation it is neither true nor false that it holds. John Broome has argued that indeterminacy cannot coexist with incomparability and since there seems to exist indeterminacy there cannot exist incomparability. At the core (...) of his argument lies the collapsing principle. There are several arguments against this principle; Erik Carlson has advanced most of these. In this paper two strategies in dealing with these arguments are discussed. One strategy is to deny the existence of a certain kind of properties; another strategy that has been advanced by Christian Constantinescu is to restrict the collapsing principle. In the paper it is argued that the first of these strategies is the most promising strategy. A novel argument in favour of this strategy is presented and several objections to the strategy are rebutted. Finally it is concluded that, even though this strategy deals with most objections, without a better argument in favour of the principle the debate seems to run into a stalemate. (shrink)

As in other European countries, in Denmark philosophy was an important factor in the cultural life of the nineteenth century. Kierkegaard lived and wrote in Copenhagen, where Hegelianism both flourished and met with serious criticism, and both of these elements can be found in his authorship. This chapter explores possible sources of inspiration for Kierkegaard's rejection of Danish Hegelianism and its follower, speculative theology, and discusses his influence on the fashionable Danish philosopher of the day, Rasmus Nielsen. By way of (...) conclusion, it is emphasized that Kierkegaard's understanding of Christianity and his struggle over it were decisive for a shift in Danish intellectual life around 1870. (shrink)

Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...) possible by a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality. (shrink)

Theoria , the international Swedish philosophy journal, was founded in 1935. Its contributors in the first 75 years include the major Swedish philosophers from this period and in addition a long list of international philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, C. D. Broad, Ernst Cassirer, Hector Neri Castañeda, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, R. M. Hare, Carl G. Hempel, Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Henry E. Kyburg, Keith Lehrer, Isaac Levi, David Lewis, Gerald MacCallum, Richard Montague, Otto Neurath, Arthur N. (...) Prior, W. V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Sosa, Robert C. Stalnaker, P. F. Strawson, Patrick Suppes, Johan van Benthem, Georg Henrik von Wright and many others. Hempel's confirmation paradoxes, Ross's deontic paradox, Montague's universal grammar and Lindström's theorem are among the contributions to philosophy that were first published in Theoria. (shrink)

This work clarifies the role of the best interest standard (BIS) as ethical principle in the medical care of children. It relates the BIS to the ethical framework of medical practice. The BIS is shown to be a general principle in medical ethics, providing grounding to prima facie obligations. The foundational BIS of Kopelman and Buchanan and Brock are reviewed and shown to be in agreement with the BIS here defended. Critics describe the BIS as being too demanding, narrow, opaque, (...) not taking the family into account and not suitable as limiting principle. This work responds to these criticisms, showing that they do not stand up to scrutiny. They either do not apply to the BIS, only apply to misuses of the BIS or criticise a BIS that is not seriously defended in the literature. (shrink)

The ecological crisis almost forces different disciplines to search together for a better world. We all share one earth: the closer we reach a certain point, the closer we come together. This places the paper amid the so-called science and religion dialogue in which theology increasingly cognises empirical research and scientific data. On the other hand, sciences are becoming increasingly aware of the need to transcend their evidential limitations to find a comprehensive paradigm. This paper will apply an exemplary methodology (...) by selecting the eco-theology of Jürgen Moltmann as a theologian who takes relevant results of scientific ecological research seriously. The Club of Rome, on the other hand, is an example of social (and natural) sciences urging to find a new inclusive paradigm for a world in peril. The juxtaposition of theology and science provides the need for a new value system emerging in social sciences. Randers makes clear that the culture of consumerism had to be replaced by cultural elements that provide substantial longer-term satisfaction and increase well-being. The latest report of the Club of Rome (2022) and Moltmann’s latest two titles on this topic (2019 and 2020) have been integrated into the argument and previous publications of the author. Contribution: This exemplary approach contributes to a scientifically grounded and biblically founded eco-theology. The two exponents of science and eco-theology provide the much-needed vocabulary for each other. The Earth Charter, one could add, provides a grammar for the engagement of eco-theology and environmental science. (shrink)

John Rawls argues that the Difference Principle would be chosen by parties trying to advance their individual interests behind the Veil of Ignorance. Behind this veil, the parties do not know who they are and they are unable to assign or estimate probabilities to their turning out to be any particular person in society. Much discussion of Rawls’s argument concerns whether he can plausibly rule out the parties’ having access to probabilities about who they are. Nevertheless, I argue that, even (...) if the parties lacked access to probabilities about who they are in society, they would still reject the Difference Principle. I argue that there are cases where it is still clear to the parties that it is not in any of their individual interests that the Difference Principle is adopted. (shrink)

Starting from MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, we investigate several codes of conduct of banks to identify the type of virtues that are needed to realize their mission. Based on this analysis, we define three core virtues: honesty, due care, and accuracy. We compare and contrast these codes of conduct with the actual behavior of banks that led to the credit crisis and find that in some cases banks did not behave according to the moral standards they set themselves. However, although banks (...) and the professionals working in them can be blamed for what they did, one should also acknowledge that the institutional context of the free market economy in which they operated made it difficult to live up to the core values lying at the basis of the codes of conduct. Given the neo-liberal free market system, innovative and risky strategies to enhance profits are considered desirable for the sake of shareholder’s interests. A return to the core virtues in the financial sector will therefore only succeed if a renewed sense of responsibility in the sector is supported by institutional changes that allow banks to put their mission into practice. (shrink)

Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on this intended reading.

Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference—and key axioms of the system merely postulate “deductive closure”. In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and hence we (...) also need a dynamic logic of inference steps showing what effort on the part of the agent makes a conclusion explicit knowledge. Strong omniscience properties of agents should be seen not as static idealizations, but as the result of dynamic processes that agents engage in. This raises two questions: (a) how to define suitable information states of agents and matching notions of explicit knowledge, (b) how to define natural processes over these states that generate new explicit knowledge. To this end, we use a static base from the existing awareness literature, extending it into a dynamic system that includes traditional acts of observation, but also adding and dropping formulas from the current ‘awareness’ set. We give a completeness theorem, and we show how this dynamics updates explicit knowledge. Then we extend our approach to multi-agent scenarios where awareness changes may happen privately. Finally, we mention further directions and related approaches. Our contribution can be seen as a ‘dynamification’ of existing awareness logics. (shrink)

Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also (...) show that there are non-standard preference relations. Hence frameworks of Gert and Rabinowicz's type are either inadequate since there are cogent arguments for both non-standard value and preference relations and these frameworks deny this, or they lack support since the arguments for non-standard value relations are unconvincing. Instead, I propose a simpler framework that allows for both non-standard value and preference relations. (shrink)

While the best interest standard (BIS) enjoys wide endorsement as the ethical and decision-making standard in pediatrics, it has been criticized as vague and indeterminate. Alternate decision-making standards have been proposed to replace or augment the BIS, notably the harm principle (HP) and constrained parental autonomy (CPA) model. In this edition of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, Lainie Friedman Ross argues that CPA is a better standard than the BIS or the HP as both guide and limiter in pediatrics. In (...) response, I review the important work done by the BIS in pediatrics, and argue that neither the HP nor the CPA can take over these functions or replace the BIS. Among other things I argue: (1) The BIS provides more robust protections for the moral claims of children. (2) The CPA model and the HP do not resolve the indeterminacy and vagueness present in complex medical situations, and the BIS is better suited to deal with this vagueness and indeterminacy. (3) The BIS is a general principle of medical ethics with special application in pediatrics; it fits seamlessly into the system of medical ethics and fulfills many functions within pediatrics. The HP and the CPA model do not fit so readily within medical ethics, and are not equipped to take over the functions of the BIS. (shrink)

If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome’s Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two alleged counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if (...) there are borderline cases. In this paper, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that it is implausible. (shrink)

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, this book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being (...) carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. -/- Readers will benefit from a succinct introduction to Spinoza’s political philosophy and from an account of civic education that is based on careful exegetical work. It draws conclusions only hinted at in Spinoza’s own writings. (shrink)

McDowell’s defence of disjunctivism is often portrayed as starting from a controversial epistemological access-internalism, which he fails to support in his writings. This paper critiques such interpretations and presents an alternative reading of McDowell’s argument in favour of disjunctivism. Taking outset in McDowell’s early debate with Michael Dummett, it is shown why disjunctivism is a consequence of McDowell’s realism combined with his acceptance of the Fregean claim that Sense determines reference. It is argued that even within the modest approach to (...) meaning theories which McDowell favour, disjunctivism is a necessary requirement for a defence of realism. This approach means that, rather than starting from controversial epistemological convictions, McDowell’s disjunctivism motivates the adoption of access-internalism, as it enables truth-ensuring experiential support for our thoughts. Hence, while I deny that disjunctivism follows from premises about the nature of knowledge, I agree with McDowell that the landscape of our debate about knowledge may be irrevocably altered once we accept disjunctivism. (shrink)

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.

Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrongness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act's consequences are compared with those of its alternatives and in part on how difficult it is to perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories. The first is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better (...) consequences than some alternative act, then it is not more wrong than the alternative act. The second is consequentialist supervenience, which says that, if two acts have equally good consequences in a situation, then they have the same deontic status in the situation. And the third is consequentialist continuity, which says that, for every act and for any difference in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the consequences of the act which would, other things being equal, not change the wrongness of that act or any alternative by more than δ. I defend a proposal that satisfies these conditions. (shrink)

In this article, the author engages with the question ‘what is so theological about theological education’, which he calls the genealogy of theology. This matter is approached from a very specific vantage point as the author was the former Dean of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Pretoria (South Africa) and has been engaged in this research project over the last 5 years as the Faculty was under severe review as to its composition and ultimately its (...) very future. This article endeavours to bring to the surface the underlying theology of the author and the paradigm he is operating from. It concludes with a definition of theology as he sees it, but with the explicit qualification of it being situated at a research-intensive university competing for a notable position on the ranking indexes of world universities. A new niche is thus opening up for theology ( vis-à-vis a seminary or even a Christian university), namely, a ‘scholarly endeavour of believers in the public sphere in order to inquire into a multi-dimensional reality in a manner that matters’. (shrink)

This article examines an argument which may negatively influence measles vaccination uptake. According to the argument, an individual child in a highly vaccinated society may be better off by being non-vaccinated; the child does not risk vaccine adverse effects and is protected against measles through herd immunity. Firstly, the conclusion of the argument is challenged by showing that herd immunity’s protection is unreliable and inferior to vaccination. Secondly, the logic of the argument is challenged by showing that the argument is (...) inherently self-defeating and therefore logically inconsistent. In practice the argument cannot be used to protect children against measles. Measles vaccination is undoubtedly best for children, even in highly vaccinated societies. Only if a medical contraindication to vaccination exists should vaccination be waived in favour of reliance on herd immunity. This places obligations on those who stand in care relationships with the child: parents, healthcare providers, and the state. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to provide a systematic and integrative picture of the main contributions presented at the colloquium which addressed the current state of theological education, proposals for the basic values to be laid as foundation for a new theological curriculum and concrete attempts to build such a curriculum in South Africa, the African continent and especially at the University of Pretoria with a particular stress on decolonisation as contextualisation. In dealing with these aspects, the article focuses on (...) whether or not theology as an academic field has a future in university and society by implementing a concrete programme of decolonisation which is adapted – by means of education – to the specifics of various local contexts including those in Africa. If the answer to this question is positive – and the colloquium contributors, as well as the authors, of this article do believe to be so – then one must find out how theology should be done in the university, how theology should work in society and what theology should be taught in the university so that its impact in society is continuously transformative and permanently relevant to human life and human existence in Africa and throughout the world. (shrink)

Defensive medicine has become pervasive. Defensive medicine is often thought of as a systems issue, the inevitable result of an adversarial malpractice environment, with consequent focus on system-responses and tort reform. But defensive medicine also has ethical and professionalism implications that should be considered beyond the need for tort reform. This article examines defensive medicine from an ethics and professionalism perspective, showing how defensive medicine is deeply problematic. First, a definition of defensive medicine is offered that describes the essence of (...) defensive practice: clinical actions with the goal of protecting the clinician against litigation or some adverse outcome. Ethical arguments against defensive medicine are considered: defensive medicine is deceptive and undermines patient autonomy; defensive medicine subjugates patient interests to physician interests and violate fiduciary obligations; defensive medicine exposes patients to harm without benefit; defensive medicine undermines trust in the profession; and defensive medicine violates obligations of justice. Possible arguments in favor of defensive medicine are considered and refuted. Defensive practice is therefore unethical and unprofessional, and should be viewed as a challenge for medical ethics and professionalism. (shrink)

The article is authored by the Dean of Faculty of Theology at the University of Pretoria, celebrating the Faculty’s centenary in 2017. The exposition of the argument is unfolded on the basis of Ricoeur’s threefold mimesis of prefiguration, configuration and reconfiguration. The earliest decisive statement with regard to the nature of the Faculty, and which is eagerly pursued, was made by the Rev. M.J. Goddefroy in 1888, epitomising theological training as of academic deference, that is as a Faculty at a (...) university and not a seminary. This has been the fibre of Theology at the University of Pretoria and intellectual inquiry is an uncompromised value. The article is a critical reflection on the past century and an orientation towards the next hundred years, identifying the essence of what a real Pretoria Model could and should be and looking ahead to the next century. ‘History is not a destination, but an orientation’, sounds like a refrain in the article. The enterprise is contextual with regard to time and space. The assessment is subsequently done in terms of this continent and this century, that is Africa and the 21st century. The conclusion of the article is that the Pretoria Model fills a unique niche in theological inquiry at public universities competing for a position among the top 500 on the ranking of world universities. (shrink)

In this dialogue a sceptic meets one that convinces him that he is safe from the void of Nothingness although it exists.

We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a (...) formal definition, and acknowledge limitations and borderline cases. Throughout we show how awareness of the two stances suggests new logical systems and new issues about translations between implicit and explicit systems, linking up with foundational concerns about identity of logical systems. But we also show how a practical facility with these complementary working styles has philosophical consequences, as it throws doubt on strong philosophical claims made by just taking one design stance and ignoring alternative ones. We will illustrate the latter benefit for the case of logical pluralism and hyper-intensional semantics. (shrink)

Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues of 'factual' versus 'procedural' information, or 'statics' versus 'dynamics'. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really tell us about information? How does its view relate to its 'cousin' epistemic logic? We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent protocol models for dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge.

In an alleged counter-example to the completeness of rational preferences, a career as a clarinettist is compared with a career in law. It seems reasonable to neither want to judge that the law career is at least as preferred as the clarinet career nor want to judge that the clarinet career is at least as preferred as the law career. The two standard interpretations of examples of this kind are, first, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to (...) be incomplete and, second, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate. In this paper, I shall argue that the difference between these interpretations is crucial for the money-pump argument for transitivity, which is the standard argument that rational preferences are transitive. I shall argue that the money-pump argument for transitivity fails if preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete but that it works if preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate and rationally required to be complete. (shrink)

In this dialogue Jeito and Immanuel K. tries to navigate in a sea filled with philosophy, God and Nothingness. They conclude that they are safe from the void of Nothingness.

Contemporary historians of logic tend to credit Bernard Bolzano with the invention of the semantic notion, of consequence, a full century before Tarski. Nevertheless, Bolzano's work played no significant rôle in the genesis of modern logical semantics. The purpose of this paper is to point out three highly original, and still quite relevant themes in Bolzano's work, being a systematic study of possible types of inference, of consistency, as well as their meta-theory. There are certain analogies with Tarski's concerns here, (...) although the main thrust seems to be different, both philosophically and technically. Thus, if only obliquely, we also provide some additional historical perspective on Tarski's achievement. (shrink)

This thesis consists of an introduction and five essays on decision theory.

What capacities for discrimination must a subject possess in order to entertain singular thoughts? Evans has suggested that a subject must be able to discriminate his referent from all other entities in order to be able to do so; what he calls Russell's Principle. Evans' view has few followers, and he has been repeatedly accused of presenting no argument in its favour. In this paper I present what I take to be Evans' argument. I suggest that he has been misinterpreted (...) as introducing Russell's Principle for the purpose of fixing reference. Rather, he introduces it in order to ensure that our conceptual capacities have the functional complexity to allow for objective thought. I suggest that the logical types of our thought are constituted by their inferential potential and argue that, even though singular thought may be possible without the satisfaction of Russell's Principle, singular thought that forms part of an objective world view is not. (shrink)

The relation between logic and philosophy of science, often taken for granted, is in fact problematic. Although current fashionable criticisms of the usefulness of logic are usually mistaken, there are indeed difficulties which should be taken seriously — having to do, amongst other things, with different scientific mentalities in the two disciplines (section 1). Nevertheless, logic is, or should be, a vital part of the theory of science. To make this clear, the bulk of this paper is devoted to the (...) key notion of a scientific theory in a logical perspective. First, various formal explications of this notion are reviewed (section 2), then their further logical theory is discussed (section 3). In the absence of grand inspiring programs like those of Klein in mathematics or Hilbert in metamathematics, this preparatory ground-work is the best one can do here. The paper ends on a philosophical note, discussing applicability and merits of the formal approach to the study of science (section 4). (shrink)

This paper defends four lines of argument that establish an ethical obligation for clinicians to be vaccinated against COVID-19. They are: (1) The obligation to protect patients against COVID-19 spread; (2) The obligation to maintain professional competence and remain available for patients; (3) Clinicians’ role and place in society in relation to COVID-19; (4) The obligation to encourage societal vaccination uptake. These arguments stand up well against potential objections and provide a compelling case to consider acceptance of COVID-19 vaccination a (...) duty for all clinicians. This duty brings with it the implication that vaccine refusal amounts to a dereliction of the professional’s ethical obligations, which means such clinicians should be subject to disciplinary action. Furthermore, this duty provides grounding for mandatory vaccination policies for clinicians. (shrink)

Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can try to understand the broader picture by looking at the empirical details. On the other side we can try to find overarching principles that explain our observations. I am deeply aware of the history of this subject but—as we all know—history repeats itself. Perhaps it is time now for, actually, deduction to take more place in science. (...) Perhaps—which of course is my own belief—we have reached the end of the road of so much depending on empirical observations. The natural sciences have reached beyond what is possible to empirically detect. My own research is an attempt to redefine our ontological starting point and to really test if the world only is physical. In this Reply I put Tambassi’s reply in the explicit context of my definition of scientific ontology. The outcome is that scientific ontology cannot settle the debate in the geographical sciences as to whether the geographical world is mind-dependent or not, but that the geographical universe, in that case, as a universe, belongs to the domain of scientific ontology. (shrink)

In this introduction, the author argues that Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt can help us rediscover the foundations of politics and political thought. In the years since World War II, the prevailing paradigm of politics has largely centred on the redistribution of resources. Hobbes and Schmitt, by contrast, help us appreciate two other conceptions of politics. Firstly, these thinkers averred that it is the problem of order – not redistribution – which is the fundamental concern for any society. Secondly, both (...) were acutely aware of the role played by myth: that is, how shared ideas – sometimes created for this very purpose – serve to promote order, social cohesion, and law‐abiding behaviour. The author also argues, finally, that normative theory and the social sciences in general have often neglected these two conceptions of politics. (shrink)

This book offers a novel theory of childhood well-being as a social good. It re-examines our fundamental assumptions about parenting, parental authority, and a liberal society's role in the raising of children. The author defends the idea that the good of a child is inexorably linked to the good of society. He identifies and critiques the problematic assumption that parenting is an extension of individual liberty and shows how we run into problems in medical decision-making for children because of this (...) assumption. He develops an objective conception of what is good for a child in liberal society, drawing on the assumptions of liberty, and from here constructs a set of things that society and its members owe children. There are ways in which society should support and intervene in parental decisions to guarantee a child's well-being. Ultimately, raising children is a social activity that requires input from society. The author then applies this theory of childhood well-being to develop a framework for medical decision-making for children. He also uses practical examples, such as vaccinations, parental leave, and healthcare access, to demonstrate the implications of his theory for public policy. The Limits of Parental Authority: Childhood Wellbeing as a Social Good will be of interest to research and advanced students working in bioethics, political philosophy, and public health policy. (shrink)